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Abstract
A good deal of time has been devoted to whether more open
economies have bigger governments. However, most of the research
has been focused mainly on trade openness, which is clearly restrictive
in an increasingly integrated world. This paper oﬀers an alternative
view to the relationship between financial openness and some key eco-
nomic variables (the size of the public sector, ...), based on a portfolio
approach. A central result of the model is that an open economy im-
plies a higher consumption-wealth ratio, lower growth, higher welfare,
and a higher size of the public sector than in a closed economy due to
the risk diversification that an open economy allows. The empirical
evidence broadly supports the main results of the model.
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1 Introduction
Do more open economies have bigger governments? A good deal of time has
been devoted to this issue since Rodrik (1998) hit the magic button showing a
positive relationship between both variables: “government expenditures are
used to provide social insurance against external risk” (p. 997)1. Many other
studies have followed suit and some of them have even cast doubts on the
robustness of the result2. However, the main focus of most of the research has
been on trade openness. This is clearly restrictive specially when financial
markets are becoming increasingly integrated3.
Liberati (2007) has recently reminded that, from a theoretical perspective,
openness can be associated to a larger or lower size of the public sector4.
According to the compensation hypothesis, more open economies have a
larger size of the public sector to compensate for higher external risk. In
contrast, the eﬃciency hypothesis (or conventional wisdom) posits that more
open economies are associated to a lower size of the public sector due to an
increased mobility of inputs. Furthermore, “as it stands, [...] the empirical
literature on the relationship between capital openness and government size
is not conclusive, as diﬀerent studies support a positive relation, the absence
of any relation or a negative relation.” (pp. 218-219). Thus Liberati (2007,
p. 215) shows that “capital openness is significantly and negatively related to
government expenditures in line with the conventional wisdom that capital
mobility may undermine the ability of governments to maintain larger public
sectors”. Moreover, the recent empirical evidence does not seem to support
the compensation hypothesis proposed by Rodrik (1998).
This paper oﬀers an alternative view to the relationship between financial
openness and some key economic variables, such as the consumption-wealth
ratio, the growth rate of wealth, welfare, and the optimal size of the public
sector, based on a portfolio approach. The model employed is an extension
of the one developed by Turnovsky [1997, Ch. 11; 1999]: a general equilib-
rium model in continuous time with perfect capital mobility in a two-country
world, where public spending enhances utility (Barro, 1990). A central result
of our model is that an open economy implies a higher consumption-wealth
ratio, lower growth, higher welfare, and a higher size of the public sector than
in a closed economy due to the risk diversification that an open economy
1The pioneer work of the “compensation hypothesis” goes back at least to Cameron
(1978).
2See Liberati (2007) for references.
3See, for instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
4See Schulze and Ursprung (1999) for the original work.
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allows5. The critical diﬀerences with previous studies are twofold. First,
financial integration is not necessarily associated to higher external risk due
to the risk diversification eﬀect. Second, financial openness is measured as
the share of the holdings of foreign capital owned by the domestic economy
over domestic wealth. Instead, the literature has usually chosen the sum of
(some) domestic assets and liabilities with respect to other countries over
GDP6. The recent availability of data on investment positions allows testing
the main results of the model7. The empirical evidence based on a sample
of 22 OECD countries for the period 1970-2004 broadly supports the main
results of the model.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the macroeconomic
equilibrium is characterized. In Section 3 the results of an open economy are
compared to those of a closed economy. The welfare-maximizing size of the
public sector is derived in Section 4. Then we discuss whether more open
economies will have a higher size of the public sector in Section 5. Section 6
provides the empirical evidence. Finally, we conclude.
2 The world economy
2.1 Basic structure
The world economy consists of two countries, each of them producing only
one homogeneous good. On each country there exist a representative agent
and a public sector, both with an infinite time horizon. This economy is
a real one, that is, there are no nominal assets, such as money, diﬀerent
financial assets, etc. Unstarred variables refer to domestic economy, whereas
starred variables refer to the foreign economy. This model will focus on the
domestic economy since the results for the foreign economy are very similar.
The homogeneous good produced by both countries can be either consu-
med or invested in capital without having to incur in any kind of adjustment
5As Obstfeld and Taylor (2004, p. 5) put it, “economic theory leaves no doubt about
the potential advantages of global financial trading,” such as allowing international risk
sharing and intertemporal trade, and imposing discipline on governments.
6See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Liberati (2007), for example. An important
exception is Turnovsky (1999, p. 889), where the size of the public sector is shown to be
higher in a small open economy than in a closed economy if and only if the country is
net creditor, when the utility function is logarithmic: “the larger government is due to
the country’s ability to export its domestic risk, rather than due to insulating the country
from foreign risks”. However, his model has not been empirically tested.
7The data is mainly provided by the International Monetary Fund, and Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
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costs. We assume that domestic production can be obtained using only do-
mestic capital, K, through an AK function, and that it can be expressed
through a first order stochastic diﬀerential equation, so that production flow
dY (the variation of the state variable) is not completely determined, but
subject to a stochastic disturbance
dY = αKdt+ αKdy,
where α > 0 is the (constant) marginal physical product of capital and dy
represents a proportional domestic productivity shock. More precisely, dy
is the increment of a stochastic process y. Those increments are temporally
independent and are normally distributed, and they satisfy that E(dy) = 0
and E(dy2) = σ2ydt. We omit, for convenience, formal references to time,
although those variables depend on time. We must note that dY indicates the
flow of production, instead of Y , as is ordinarily done in stochastic calculus.
The foreign economy is structured symmetrically to the domestic eco-
nomy. Thus, foreign production is carried out using capital domiciled abroad,
K∗, with a production function very similar to the one in the domestic eco-
nomy
dY ∗ = α∗K∗dt+ α∗K∗dy∗,
where α∗ > 0 is the marginal physical product of capital and dy∗ represents
a proportional foreign productivity shock. We should note that dy∗ is the
increment of a stochastic process y∗. Those increments are temporally inde-
pendent and are distributed normally, satisfying that E(dy∗) = 0 and that
E(dy∗
2
) = σ2y∗dt.
Both domestic capital, K, and foreign capital, K∗, can be owned by the
domestic agent or the foreign agent. The subscript d denotes the holdings
of assets of the domestic agent and the subscript f denotes the holdings of
assets of the foreign agent. So it must be satisfied that
K = Kd +Kf
K∗ = K∗d +K
∗
f .
The wealth of the domestic agent,W , and the wealth of the foreign agent,
W ∗, therefore will be
W = Kd +K
∗
d (1)
W ∗ = Kf +K
∗
f . (2)
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2.2 Domestic economy
2.2.1 The maximization problem
The preferences of the domestic representative agent are represented by a
constant elasticity of substitution (or isoelastic) intertemporal utility func-
tion where she obtains utility from private consumption, C, and from public
consumption, G
E0
Z ∞
0
1
γ
(CGη)γe−βtdt (3)
−∞ < γ < 1; η > 0; γη < 1; γ(1 + η) < 1.
The welfare of the domestic agent in period 0 is the expected value of the
discounted sum of instantaneous utilities, conditioned on the set of disposable
information in period 0. The parameter β is a positive subjective discount
rate (or rate of time preference). For the isoelastic utility function the Arrow-
Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is given by the expression 1 − γ.
When γ = 0 this function corresponds to the logarithmic utility function.
The empirical evidence suggests a high degree of relative risk aversion, so that
γ < 0 (Campbell, 1996). The parameter η measures the influence of public
consumption on welfare. We assume that both private consumption and
public consumption generate a positive marginal utility, so that η > 0. The
other restrictions on the utility function are necessary to ensure concavity
with respect to private consumption and public consumption.
The domestic agent consumes at a deterministic rate C(t)dt in the in-
stant dt and must pay the corresponding taxes and thus the dynamic budget
restriction can be expressed in the following way
dW = [αKd + α∗K∗d ] dt+ [αKddy + α
∗K∗ddy
∗]− Cdt− dT, (4)
where dT denotes the taxes the domestic representative agent must pay to
the public sector. The structure of taxes will be detailed below.
There is a public sector besides the domestic representative agent. Public
sector spending, dG, increases with wealth, so we can achieve a balanced
growth path.8 Public spending evolves according to
dG = gWdt+Wdz, (5)
8Other rules can also achieve a balanced growth path. See Turnovsky (1996) for more
details.
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where g = G/W is the size of the public sector and dz is the increment of
a stochastic process z. Those increments are temporally independent and
are normally distributed, satisfying that E(dz) = 0 and E(dz2) = σ2zdt.
Public sector spending is financed solely via tax collection: the public sector
equilibrates its budget continuously, that is,
dT = dG. (6)
Combining equations (5) and (6), and plugging them into (4), we get the
following restriction for the resources of the domestic economy
dW = [αKd + α∗K∗d − C − gW ] dt+ [αKddy + α∗K∗ddy∗ −Wdz] . (7)
Let us remember that the holding of assets by the domestic agent is sub-
ject to the domestic wealth equation (1). If we define the following variables
for the domestic agent
nd ≡
Kd
W
= share of the domestic portfolio materialized
in domestic capital
n∗d ≡
K∗d
W
= share of the domestic portfolio materialized
in foreign capital,
equation (1) can be expressed more conveniently as
1 = nd + n
∗
d (8)
and substituting those variables into the budget constraint (7) we obtain the
following dynamic restriction for the resources of the domestic economy
dW
W
=
∙
αnd + α∗n∗d −
C
W
− g
¸
dt+ [αnddy + α∗n∗ddy
∗ − dz] . (9)
This equation can be more conveniently expressed as
dW
W
= ψdt+ dw, (10)
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where the deterministic and stochastic parts of the rate of accumulation of
assets, dW/W , can be expressed in the following way
ψ ≡ nd [α− α∗] + α∗ − g −
C
W
≡ ρ− g − C
W
(11)
dw ≡ nd [αdy − α∗dy∗] + α∗dy∗ − dz, (12)
where ρ ≡ αnd + α∗n∗d ≡ nd [α− α∗] + α∗ denotes the gross rate of return of
the asset portfolio.
2.2.2 Equilibrium
Now the case where the public sector acts as a central planner is analyzed.
The objective of the central planner consists in choosing the path of pri-
vate consumption and portfolio shares that maximizes the expected value of
the intertemporal utility function (3) of the domestic representative agent,
subject to W (0) = W0, (10), (11), and (12). This optimization is a stochas-
tic optimum control problem.9 Initially we assume that the public sector
establi-shes an arbitrarily exogenous size of the public sector, g. We analyze
the case in which such a size is chosen optimally in section 4.
The macroeconomic equilibrium is derived in Appendix A. The equili-
brium portfolio shares and the consumption-wealth ratio in the domestic
open economy are given by
nd =
α− α∗
[1− γ(1 + η)]∆ +
α∗
2
σ2y∗ − αα∗σyy∗ + ασyz − α∗σy∗z
∆
(13)
n∗d = 1− nd (14)µ
C
W
¶
o
=
1
(1− γ)(1 + η) [β − γ(1 + η) (ρ− g)
+0.5γ(1 + η)[1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
¤
, (15)
where
∆ = α2σ2y − 2αα∗σyy∗ + α∗
2
σ2y∗ (16)
σ2w,o = n
2
dα
2σ2y + 2ndn
∗
dαα
∗σyy∗ + n∗
2
d α
∗2σ2y∗ + σ
2
z
−2ndασyz − 2n∗dα∗σy∗z. (17)
9To solve problems of stochastic optimum control see, for example, Kamien and
Schwartz (1991, Section 22), Malliaris and Brock (1982, Ch. 2), Obstfeld (1992), or
Turnovsky (1997, Ch. 9; 2000, Ch. 15).
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Do note that neither the expression ∆ nor the variance of the rate of accu-
mulation of domestic assets, σ2w,o, can be negative and the variables with the
subscript o refer to values in an open economy. Appendix B shows that the
second order conditions are satisfied.
Then, the equilibrium rate of wealth accumulation of the open domestic
economy follows the stochastic process
dW
W
= ψodt+ dwo, (18)
where the deterministic and stochastic components are, respectively
ψo =
1
(1− γ)(1 + η) {(1 + η) (ρ− g)− β
−0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
ª
(19)
dwo = ndαdy + n∗dα
∗dy∗ − dz.
Even though with more general utility functions the optimal portfolio
shares and consumption-wealth ratio will be functions of time, in this model
all those variables are constant because the utility function exhibits constant
relative risk aversion, the production function is linear, and the mean and
variances of the underlying stochastic processes are stationary: the equilib-
rium is characterized by balanced real growth, where all the (real) assets
grow at the same rate, and by constant consumption-wealth ratio and port-
folio shares. The result is very similar to Turnovsky (1997, ch. 11). The
same is also true for the foreign economy, as we shall see below.10
Now we describe the behavior of the domestic economy if it were closed
in order to compare the results of an open economy with those of a closed
economy later on. In a model of perfect capital mobility such as this, where
domestic and foreign assets are traded without restrictions, we use the shares
of the domestic portfolio materialized in domestic and foreign capital, nd
and n∗d respectively, to approximate the degree of openness of the domestic
economy. Since our emphasis is on the trade of assets, then we call closed
economy the situation where there is no trade of assets. However, we should
bear in mind that what we call closed economy is compatible with positive
amounts of exports and imports, but subject to the restriction that the trade
of goods must be balanced. In the case of a closed economy, the equilibrium
solution will be given by the expressions
10We refer to Turnovsky (1997, 2000) for a standard review of the impact of changes
in exogenous variables on the consumption-wealth ratio, portfolio shares, the growth rate,
and welfare.
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µ
C
W
¶
c
=
1
(1− γ)(1 + η) {β − γ(1 + η) (α− g)
+0.5γ(1 + η)[1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,c
ª
(20)
σ2w,c = α
2σ2y + σ
2
z − 2ασyz (21)
ψc =
1
(1− γ)(1 + η) {(1 + η) (α− g)− β
−0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,c
ª
(22)
dwc = αdy − dz,
where the variables with the subscript c refer to values in a closed economy.
2.3 Welfare
Economic welfare is measured by the value function we have used to solve the
problem of intertemporal optimization, given by equation (45) in Appendix
B
V (W ) =
gηγ
γ(1 + η)
µ
C
W
¶γ−1
W γ(1+η). (23)
From the total diﬀerential of equation (23) we obtain, after some algebra,
that
dV
V
= (γ − 1)d(C/W )
C/W
+ γη
dg
g
, (24)
where we can observe that changes in the optimal consumption-wealth ratio
and the (exogenous) size of the public sector have an impact on welfare.
First, a higher optimal consumption-wealth ratio can improve or dete-
riorate the welfare of the domestic economy. That is due to the fact that
the value function can take either positive or negative values, depending on
the sign of the coeﬃcient γ. Since C/W and g are positive in equation (23)
then γV (W ) > 0. For the case γ < 0, anything that increases the opti-
mal consumption-wealth ratio raises welfare. Thus, for example, a higher
subjective discount rate, increasing the optimal consumption-wealth ratio,
generates higher welfare if γ < 0.
Second, the size of the public sector is an important factor influencing
welfare. Do note that the optimal consumption-wealth ratio, given by equa-
tion (15), also depends on the size of the public sector, g. Therefore, the
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impact of changes in the size of the public sector on welfare is given by
dV
V
= γ
∙
η − g
C/W
¸
dg
g
.
Thus, a higher size of the public sector can increase or reduce welfare, even
though it reduces unambiguously the growth rate. The crucial point lies on
whether g Q ηC/W . If g < ηC/W , an increase in the size of the public sec-
tor raises welfare. That is due to the fact that the marginal utility derived
from public consumption is higher than the marginal utility derived from
private consumption. If g = ηC/W , an increase in the size of the public sec-
tor does not change welfare because the marginal utility derived from public
consumption is equal to the marginal utility derived from private consump-
tion: it is the size of the public sector that maximizes welfare, as we shall see
below. Finally, if g > ηC/W , an increase in the size of the public sector re-
duces welfare because the marginal utility derived from public consumption
is lower than the marginal utility derived from private consumption. These
results are related to those in Turnovsky (2000, p. 438): “Thus we infer
that increasing the growth rate by reducing government expenditure is not
necessarily welfare improving. This will be the case only if initially g is above
its optimum”. We shall see below that this is completely consistent with the
analysis of the size of the public sector that maximizes welfare.
2.4 Foreign economy
2.4.1 The maximization problem
The problem facing the foreign representative agent can be formulated in an
analogous way. Her preferences are represented by the following intertempo-
ral utility function
E
Z ∞
0
1
γ∗
(C∗G∗
η∗
)γ
∗
e−β
∗tdt
−∞ < γ∗ < 1; η∗ > 0; γ∗η∗ < 1; γ∗(1 + η∗) < 1.
The equation of the rate of accumulation of wealth of the foreign repre-
sentative agent can be expressed as
dW ∗
W ∗
= ψ∗dt+ dw∗,
where
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ψ∗ ≡ nfα+ n∗fα∗ − g∗ −
C∗
W ∗
≡ ρ∗ − g∗ − C
∗
W ∗
dw∗ ≡ nfαdy + n∗fα∗dy∗ − dz∗.
2.4.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium portfolio shares and consumption-wealth ratio in the foreign
economy are
nf =
α− α∗
[1− γ∗(1 + η∗)]∆ +
α∗
2
σ2y∗ − αα∗σyy∗ + ασyz∗ − α∗σy∗z∗
∆
n∗f = 1− nfµ
C∗
W ∗
¶
o
=
1
(1− γ∗)(1 + η∗) {β
∗ − γ∗(1 + η∗)(ρ∗ − g∗)
−0.5γ∗(1 + η∗) [γ∗(1 + η∗)− 1]σ2w∗,o
ª
,
where
σ2w∗,o = n
2
fα
2σ2y + 2nfn
∗
fαα
∗σyy∗ + n∗
2
f α
∗2σ2y∗
+σ2z∗ − 2nfασyz∗ − 2n∗fα∗σy∗z∗.
The equilibrium rate of accumulation of wealth in the foreign economy
follows the stochastic process
dW ∗
W ∗
= ψ∗odt+ dw
∗
o
where its deterministic and stochastic components are, respectively
ψ∗o =
1
(1− γ∗)(1 + η∗) {(1 + η
∗)(ρ∗ − g∗)− β∗
−0.5γ∗(1 + η∗) [γ∗(1 + η∗)− 1]σ2w∗,o
ª
dw∗o = nfαdy + n
∗
fα
∗dy∗ − dz∗.
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3 Open economy versus closed economy
In order to compare the results of an open economy with those of a closed
economy it is convenient to calculate the diﬀerence between the variance of
the growth rate in an open economy and in a closed economy. Thus if we
subtract equation (21) from equation (17) we obtain, after some algebra, that
σ2w,o − σ2w,c = ∆n∗d (n∗d − 2en∗d) , (25)
where
en∗d = α2σ2y − αα∗σyy∗ − ασyz + α∗σy∗z∆ ,
is the share of the domestic portfolio materialized in foreign capital that
minimizes the variance of the growth rate given by equation (17).
3.1 The consumption-wealth ratio
Subtracting equation (20) from equation (15) we obtain, using equation (25),
that, after some algebra,
µ
C
W
¶
o
−
µ
C
W
¶
c
= − 1
1− γ
n
0.5γ [1− γ (1 + η)]∆n∗2d
o
. (26)
The sign of the diﬀerence between both consumption-wealth ratios depends
only on the value of the parameter γ. Thus, if γ < 0, then the consumption-
wealth ratio will be higher in an open economy than in a closed economy,
provided that n∗d 6= 0. An easy way to explain that result can be found,
without loss of generalization, focusing on the case nd = end, where
end = 1− en∗d = α∗2σ2y∗ − αα∗σyy∗ + ασyz − α∗σy∗z∆ , (27)
denotes the share of the domestic portfolio materialized in domestic capital
that minimizes the variance of the growth rate of wealth [equation (17)].
When nd = end we know from equation (25) that the variance of the growth
rate in an open economy is lower than in a closed economy, σ2w,o < σ
2
w,c.
Totally diﬀerentiating equation (15) it can be easily shown that a reduction
in the variance of the growth rate is equivalent to an increase in the gross
rate of return of the asset portfolio, ρ, of 0.5 [1− γ(1 + η)]. A higher gross
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rate of return of the asset portfolio, ρ, raises (reduces) consumption-wealth
ratio if γ < (>)0 and does not change if γ = 0 [see equation (15) above].
The result depends on the sum of two opposite standard eﬀects, substitu-
tion and income eﬀects. A higher gross rate of return of the asset portfolio
has always a negative substitution eﬀect since consumption becomes less at-
tractive whereas investment is more attractive. The income eﬀect on the
consumption-wealth ratio, originated by a higher gross rate of return of the
asset portfolio, is equal to unity: it makes possible to raise both actual and
future consumption. If γ < (>)0, income (substitution) eﬀect dominates
substitution (income) eﬀect and if γ = 0 the two eﬀects compensate each
other. From here onwards whenever a result depends on the sign of the para-
meter γ, we shall only focus on the case where γ < 0, for being the most
relevant situation empirically (Campbell, 1996). Since a lower variance of
the growth rate originates a stronger positive income eﬀect than the negative
substitution eﬀect on the consumption-wealth ratio, then the consumption-
wealth ratio in an open economy will be higher than in a closed economy for
γ < 0. In an open economy a higher level of welfare is achieved choosing a
higher consumption-wealth ratio, provided that γ < 0, as we saw in Section
2.3. Additionally, the higher the value of the optimal share of the domestic
portfolio materialized in foreign capital, n∗d, the higher the diﬀerence between
the results of an open economy with those of a closed economy, other things
being equal.
3.2 The growth rate
The growth rate in an open economy is compared to that in a closed eco-
nomy departing from equation (11) corresponding to an open economy and
subtracting from it that corresponding to a closed economy
ψo − ψc = n∗d(α∗ − α)−
∙µ
C
W
¶
o
−
µ
C
W
¶
c
¸
. (28)
The growth rate in an open economy can be higher than, equal to or lower
than that in a closed economy, depending on the signs of the two terms in
(28). For example, we can establish focusing on the case where γ < 0 (and
n∗d > 0) that:
• If α ≥ α∗, the growth rate in an open economy will be lower than that
in a closed economy. The reason behind is that the consumption-wealth
ratio in an open economy is higher than that in a closed economy and,
additionally, if α ≥ α∗ the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio
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in an open economy, ρ, is lower than or equal to the marginal physical
product of the domestic capital.
• If α < α∗, the growth rate in an open economy can be higher than,
equal to or lower than that in a closed economy.
Table 1 sums up the comparison between the growth rate in an open eco-
nomy with that in a closed economy given by equation (28), for n∗d > 0. As
Obstfeld (1994, p. 1327) puts it, “the mechanism linking global diversifica-
tion to growth is the attendant world portfolio shift from safe, but low-yield,
capital into riskier, high-yield capital,” thus focusing on the case that α < α∗
to show that an open economy may raise growth. Turnovsky (1997, p. 438)
goes along the same line, comparing the growth rate in a risky open economy
with that in a riskless closed economy, for the case that α < α∗ and γ = 0:
the growth rate raises unambiguously in an open economy. However, it be-
comes clear in Table 1 that risk sharing does not necessarily raise growth.
In fact, as long as the marginal product of capital is similar across countries,
for instance, then the growth rate will be higher in a closed economy than
in an open economy. Only when the marginal product of foreign capital α∗
is higher than the marginal product of domestic capital α, an open economy
may promote growth.
3.3 Welfare
It is easy to show that welfare is unambiguously higher in an open economy
than in a closed economy, simply going back to the value function given
by equation (23): the consumption-wealth ratio in an open economy will
be higher than that in a closed economy for γ < 0 [see equation (26)]. In
fact, the result applies to all values of the parameter γ, thus reinforcing
the conclusions reached by Obstfeld (1994, pp. 1326-1327): “international
risk-sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through its positive eﬀect on
expected consumption growth.” Similarly, Turnovsky (1997, pp. 438-439)
has shown that “the higher growth rate more than oﬀsets the additional
risk, and the opportunity to invest in a higher return, higher risk foreign asset
improves welfare,” for the logarithmic case. However, we should note that the
crucial factor behind welfare improvement stems from the risk sharing eﬀect
implied by financial integration, rather than from shifting portfolios from low
risk-low yield assets to high risk-high yield assets in an open economy, as in
Obstfeld (1994) or Turnovsky (1997). Therefore, financial openness raises
unambiguously welfare in all cases, regardless of whether α S α∗.
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4 The optimal size of the public sector
We have so far compared the results in an open economy with those in
a closed economy assuming an exogenous size of the public sector. Now we
obtain the size of the public sector that maximizes the welfare of the domestic
representative agent or, for short, the optimal size of the public sector. Then
the results of an open economy are compared to those of a closed economy.
Formally, the expression in the right hand side of the Bellman equation
(38) in Appendix A is partially diﬀerentiated with respect to g, where G =
gW , to calculate the optimal size of the public sector
η
g
Cγ (gW )ηγ − V 0(W )W = 0,
which combining with the first order condition equation (39) implies that the
optimal size of the public sector, bg, must satisfy the following condition
gˆ = η
C
W
, (29)
which is identical to Turnovsky (1996, p. 60; 1999, p. 888).11 Equation
(29) implies that the marginal utility of public consumption must be equal
to the marginal utility of private consumption when both public and private
consumption are optimally chosen.
Combining equation (29) with (15) we can calculate the optimal size of
the public sector, the consumption-wealth ratio, and the growth rate when
public consumption is optimally chosen in an open economy
gˆo =
η
[1− γ(1 + η)] (1 + η) {β − γ(1 + η)ρ
+0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
ª
(30)µ
C
W
¶
o
=
1
[1− γ(1 + η)](1 + η) {β − γ(1 + η)ρ
+0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
ª
(31)
ψo =
1
1− γ(1 + η)
©
ρ− β − 0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
ª
.(32)
11We should note that the optimal size of the public sector, gˆ, is not exactly identical to
that shown in Turnovsky (1999). However, it is identical in the sense that in both cases
the optimal ratio of public consumption to private consumption is given by G/C = η.
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Do note that whenever we refer to the optimal size of the public sector in
general we will use the term bg and whenever we refer only to the optimal size
in an open economy we will use bgo.
In addition, we obtain the optimal size of the public sector, the consump-
tion-wealth ratio, and the growth rate when public consumption is optimally
chosen in a closed economy
gˆc =
η
[1− γ(1 + η)] (1 + η) {β − γ(1 + η)α
+0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,c
ª
(33)µ
C
W
¶
c
=
1
[1− γ(1 + η)](1 + η) {β − γ(1 + η)α
+0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,c
ª
(34)
ψc =
1
1− γ(1 + η)
©
α− β − 0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,c
ª
(35)
4.1 Open economy versus closed economy
Focusing first on the optimal size of the public sector, if we subtract equation
(33) from equation (30) we obtain using equation (25), after some algebra,
that
gˆo − gˆc = −0.5ηγ∆n∗
2
d . (36)
The sign of the result in equation (36) depends only on the parameter γ: the
size of the public sector in an open economy will be higher than that in a
closed economy for γ < 0. Let us see why. Without loss of generalization, fo-
cusing again on the case nd = end, where end is the variance-minimizing share
of the domestic portfolio [see equation (27)], the variance in the growth rate
in an open economy is lower than that in a closed economy, σ2w,o < σ
2
w,c [see
equation (25)]. Since a reduction of the variance in the growth rate is equiv-
alent to an increase in the gross rate of return of the asset portfolio, that, in
turn, originates a stronger positive income eﬀect on the public consumption-
wealth ratio than the negative substitution eﬀect: the size of the public sector
in an open economy will be higher than in a closed economy.12 Furthermore,
it is similar to the result shown in Turnovsky (1999) for a logarithmic util-
ity function, provided that the domestic economy holds positive stocks of
12In addition, the higher the value of the optimal share of the domestic portfolio ma-
terialized in foreign capital, n∗d, the higher the diﬀerence between the optimal size of the
public sector in an open economy with that in a closed economy is.
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foreign capital in a small open economy. However, it should be emphasized
that our result has been shown for empirically the most relevant case that
γ < 0, no matter what the values of portfolio shares are. On top of that,
Turnovsky (1999, p. 889) bases his results on “the country’s ability to ex-
port its domestic risk, rather than due to insulating the country from foreign
risk, as argued by Rodrik [1998].” Instead, our argument resembles more
Rodrik’s (1998. p. 1011) “insulation function” against external risk rather
than Turnovsky’s “risk exporting” argument. However, while risk sharing is
a key factor behind our result, Rodrik underlines the central role played by
the public sector in insulating against external risk.
Similarly, since the optimal size of the public sector is given by equation
(29) and the diﬀerence in the size of the public sector by equation (36),
the diﬀerence between the consumption-wealth ratio in an open economy
[equation (31)] and that in a closed economy [equation (34)], that is,
µ
C
W
¶
o
−
µ
C
W
¶
c
= −0.5γ∆n∗2d ,
shows that the consumption-wealth ratio in an open economy will be higher
than in a closed economy, for γ < 0, as in Section 3. Analogous results to
the case when the size of the public sector was exogenously given apply for
the impact of financial openness on the growth rate [see Table 1] and welfare.
Thus, the growth rate is higher in a closed economy than in an open economy
for similar productivities across countries. Only when the marginal product
of foreign capital α∗ is higher than the marginal product of domestic capital
α the opposite may be true. Welfare is unambiguously higher in an open
economy.
5 Data sources
22 OECD countries for the period 1970-2004: Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The data on interna-
tional investment positions have been obtained from the International Mon-
etary Fund´s International Financial Statistics. Additionally, as data on
international investment positions are incomplete or missing for many coun-
tries (specially before 1980-1986), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) provide
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an excellent source of data for those years13. The data on consumption, size
of the public sector, and so on is based on World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators. Broadly speaking, the data required in order to test the
results (specially domestic capital, foreign capital, wealth and so on) have
been constructed following the procedure by Kraay & Ventura (2000)14.
6 The empirical evidence
The model postulates a positive relationship between the optimal size of the
public sector (with respect to wealth) and financial openness. The positive
association can be tested with the regression equation [see equation (36)]
µ
G
W
¶
ct
= α+ βn∗d,ct + uct,
where (G/W )ct denotes the consumption-wealth ratio for country c in period
t, n∗d,ct denotes the portfolio share of foreign capital in domestic wealth for
country c in period t, and uct is the error term for country c in period t.
Under the null hypothesis that a more open economy should have a higher
size of the public sector is true then the coeﬃcient β should be positive.
Table 2 shows the results by OLS. The point estimate β is equal to 0.03
and thus it is positive. Additionally, the between-group estimates (that is,
based on the mean values of the variables of the group) and the within-group
estimates (also called fixed-eﬀects estimators, that is, in terms of deviations
from the mean values of the variables of the group) are shown. The between-
group and within-group estimates for the coeﬃcient capturing financial open-
ness are also found to be positive. Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the
value of the parameter β is equal to zero can be rejected, except for the
between-group estimate.
Then some control variables are taken into account in the regression.
They include population and output per capita (both in levels and growth
rates), so that the size of the economy, and also possible pressures on gov-
ernment spending are considered; current account balance (as a percentage
of GDP), as a potential influence on the size of the public sector; and a time
trend that can capture possible upward or downward movements in economic
13Please note that most of the data from IMF’s IFS and from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) coincide for recent years.
14See Appendix 2 of their work. The data employed in this paper is available at
http://paginaspersonales.deusto.es/ineraus/.
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variables. The period analyzed is restricted to 1975-2004 due to data avail-
ability. When control variables are added to the regression, these variables
have, in general, little eﬀect on the pooled estimate of the coeﬃcient β, as
shown in Table 3. Additionally, while the between estimate (positive) is
reinforced, results do change only for the within-group estimate.
The result that consumption-wealth ratio is higher in an open economy
than in a closed economy can be tested with the regression equation [see
equation (26)]
µ
C
W
¶
ct
= α+ βn∗d,ct + uct,
where (C/W )ct denotes consumption-wealth ratio for country c in period
t, n∗d,ct denotes the portfolio share of foreign capital in domestic wealth for
country c in period t, and uct is the error term for country c in period t.
Under the null hypothesis that more open economies should have higher
consumption-wealth ratios is true then the parameter β should be positive.
We show in Table 5 the results of fitting the regression equation by or-
dinary least squares (OLS). The coeﬃcient β is negative but almost zero
in the pooled regression. Additionally, whereas we get a positive value of
the between estimate, again a negative one is found in the within estimate.
On the other hand, the null hypothesis that the parameter value is equal to
zero cannot be statistically rejected in any of the three estimates. Once we
add control variables to the regression equation, the results of testing change
considerably: the estimates of the coeﬃcient β are positive in the three re-
gressions, as it is shown in Table 4. However, the null hypothesis that the
coeﬃcient β is equal to zero is rejected in the within regression.
7 Conclusions
Much time has been devoted to whether more open economies have bigger
governments since Rodrik (1998) published his seminal work. Recent studies
have even challenged this result. However, most of the research has been
focused on trade openness rather than on financial openness, which is re-
strictive specially when financial markets are increasingly integrated. Recent
studies show a negative relationship between financial openness and the size
of the public sector due to an increased mobility of inputs (the eﬃciency
hypothesis) rather a positive one (the compensation hypothesis).
This paper oﬀers an alternative view to the relationship between financial
openness and some key economic variables, such as the consumption-wealth
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ratio, the growth rate of wealth, welfare, and the optimal size of the public
sector, based on a portfolio approach. A central result of the model is that
an open economy implies a higher consumption-wealth ratio, lower growth,
higher welfare, and a higher size of the public sector than in a closed economy
due to the risk diversification achieved in an open economy. The empirical
evidence broadly supports the main results of the model.
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A Optimization
The first step in order to solve the optimization problem in the domestic
economy is to introduce a value function, V (W ), which is defined as
V (W ) = Max
{C,nd}
E0
Z ∞
0
1
γ
(CGη)γe−βtdt, (37)
subject to restrictions (10), (11), and (12) and given initial wealth. The
value function in period 0 is the expected value of the discounted sum of
instantaneous utilities, evaluated along the optimal path, starting in period
0 in the state W (0) =W0.
Second, starting from equation (37) the value function must satisfy the
following equation, known as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of sto-
chastic control theory or, for short, the Bellman equation
βV (W ) = Max
{C,nd}
∙
1
γ
(CGη)γ + V 0(W )Wψ + 0.5V 00(W )W 2σ2w
¸
. (38)
Third, (38) is partially diﬀerentiated with respect to C and nd in order
to get the first order optimality conditions of this problem
Cγ−1Gηγ − V 0(W ) = 0 (39)
V 0(W )W (α− α∗) + V 00(W )W 2cov [dw,αdy − α∗dy∗] = 0. (40)
The solution to this maximization problem is obtained through trial and
error. We seek to find a value function V (W ) that satisfies, on the one hand,
the first order optimality conditions and, on the other, the Bellman equation.
In the case of isoelastic utility functions the value function has the same form
of the utility function [Merton (1969), generalized in Merton (1971)]. Thus,
we guess that the value function is of the form
V (W ) = AW γ(1+η), (41)
where the coeﬃcient A is determined below. That guess implies
V 0(W ) = Aγ(1 + η)W γ(1+η)−1
V 00(W ) = Aγ(1 + η) [γ(1 + η)− 1]W γ(1+η)−2.
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Inserting these expressions into the first order optimality conditions (39)
and (40), the result is
Cγ−1Gηγ = Aγ(1 + η)W γ(1+η)−1 (42)
(α− α∗) dt = [1− γ(1 + η)] cov [dw,αdy − α∗dy∗] . (43)
Both are typical equations in stochastic models in continuous time. Equation
(42) indicates that at the optimum, the marginal utility derived from private
consumption must be equal to the marginal change in the value function or
the marginal utility of wealth. Equation (43) shows that the optimal choice
of portfolio shares must be such that the risk-adjusted rates of return of both
domestic and foreign capital are equalized.
Combining (42) and (43), and substituting them in the equation (38),
we are able to calculate, after some algebra, the equilibrium portfolio shares
and the consumption-wealth ratio in the domestic open economy, shown in
equations (13), (14), and (15),
nd =
α− α∗
[1− γ(1 + η)]∆ +
α∗
2
σ2y∗ − αα∗σyy∗ + ασyz − α∗σy∗z
∆
n∗d = 1− ndµ
C
W
¶
o
=
1
(1− γ)(1 + η) [β − γ(1 + η) (ρ− g)
+0.5γ(1 + η)[1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
¤
,
where
∆ = α2σ2y − 2αα∗σyy∗ + α∗
2
σ2y∗
σ2w,o = n
2
dα
2σ2y + 2ndn
∗
dαα
∗σyy∗ + n∗
2
d α
∗2σ2y∗ + σ
2
z
−2ndασyz − 2n∗dα∗σy∗z,
as they are shown in equations (16) and (17).
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B Second order conditions
In order to guarantee that consumption is positive in the domestic open
economy we impose the feasibility condition that the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth [see equation (15)] must be positive since wealth does
not become negative
1
(1− γ)(1 + η) {β − γ(1 + η) (ρ− g)
+0.5γ(1 + η)[1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w,o
ª
> 0.
For the first order optimality conditions to characterize a maximum, the
corresponding second order condition must be satisfied, that is, the Hessian
matrix associated to the maximization problem and evaluated at the optimal
values of the choice variables
"
(γ − 1) (V 0(W ))
γ−2
γ−1 0
0 V 00(W )W 2∆
#
must be negative definite,15 which implies that
(γ − 1) (V 0(W ))
γ−2
γ−1 < 0
V 00(W )W 2∆ < 0,
where ∆ > 0 (in a risky economy) was already defined in equation (16). To
evaluate those conditions, first we obtain the value of the coeﬃcient A in
equation (42)
A =
gηγ
γ(1 + η)
µ
C
W
¶γ−1
, (44)
where C/W is the optimal value pointed out by equation (15). Then we
insert (44) into the value function (41). Noting that g = G/W , the value
15See Chiang (1984, pp. 320-323), for example.
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function is given, after some algebra, by
V (W ) =
gηγ
γ(1 + η)
µ
C
W
¶γ−1
W γ(1+η), (45)
where we can observe that, given the restrictions on the utility function,
V 0(W ) > 0 and V 00(W ) < 0 provided that C/W > 0.
In addition, we impose that the macroeconomic equilibrium must satisfy
the transversality condition so as to guarantee the convergence of the value
function
lim
t→∞
E
£
V (W ) e−βt
¤
= 0. (46)
Now let us show that should the feasibility condition be satisfied, that would
be equivalent to satisfy the transversality condition.16 To evaluate (46), we
start expressing the dynamics of the accumulation of wealth
dW = ψWdt+Wdw. (47)
The solution to equation (47), starting from the initial wealth W (0), is17
W (t) =W (0)e(ψ−0.5σ
2
w)t+w(t)−w(0).
Since the increments of w are temporally independent and are normally dis-
tributed then18
E[AW γ(1+η)e−βt] = E[AW (0)γ(1+η)eγ(1+η)(ψ−0.5σ
2
w)t+γ(1+η)[w(t)−w(0)]−βt]
= AW (0)γ(1+η)e[γ(1+η)(ψ−0.5σ
2
w)+0.5γ
2(1+η)2σ2w−β]t.
The transversality condition (46) will be satisfied if and only if
γ(1 + η)
©
ψ − 0.5γ(1 + η) [1− γ(1 + η)]σ2w
ª
− β < 0.
Now substituting equations (11) and (15), it can be shown that this condition
is equivalent to
16See Merton (1969). Turnovsky (2000) provides, for example, the proof of the transver-
sality condition as well.
17See Malliaris and Brock (1982, pp. 135-136), for example.
18See Malliaris and Brock (1982, pp. 137-138), for example.
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CW
> 0,
and thus feasibility guarantees convergence as well.
Finally, it should be noted that since the public sector equilibrates its
budget continuously, the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector
is satisfied trivially.
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Table 1: Comparing growth rates
γ > 0 γ = 0 γ < 0
α > α∗ ψo Q ψc ψo < ψc ψo < ψc
α = α∗ ψo > ψc ψo = ψc ψo < ψc
α < α∗ ψo > ψc ψo > ψc ψo Q ψc
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Table 2: Openness and the size of the public sector
Pooled
regression
Between
regression
Within
regression
Portfolio share 0.0302 0.0801 0.0141
(0.0057) (0.0527) (0.0043)
R2 0.0357 0.1038 0.5964
No. of observations 766 22 766
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Sources: IFS (IMF), WDI (WB), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007),
and own elaboration.
Table 3: Openness and the size of the public sector (with control variables)
Pooled
regression
Between
regression
Within
regression
Portfolio share 0.03086 0.1279 -0.0010
(0.0073) (0.0518) (0.0074)
Time trend 0.0002 0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Current account (%GDP) -0.1875 -0.6121 -0.0946
(0.0249) (0.2110) (0.0201)
Population -7.04E-11 -7.06E-11 -1.41E-10
(1.58E-11) (6.52E-11) (1.21E-10)
Population growth -0.0052 -0.0213 0.0023
(0.0018) (0.0119) (0.0017)
GDP per capita -1.21E-08 2.24E-06 -9.52E-07
(2.61E-07) (1.47E-06) (4.84E-07)
GDP per capita growth -0.0002 0.0017 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0055) (0.0003)
R2 0.1570 0.4700 0.6307
No. of observations 651 22 651
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Sources: IFS (IMF), WDI (WB), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007),
and own elaboration.
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Table 4: Openness and consumption-wealth ratio
Pooled
regression
Between
regression
Within
regression
Portfolio share -0.0007 0.0354 -0.0133
(0.0153) (0.1410) (0.0120)
R2 0.000003 0.0031 0.5429
No. of observations 765 22 765
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Sources: IFS (IMF), WDI (WB), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007),
and own elaboration.
Table 5: Openness and consumption-wealth ratio (with control variables)
Pooled
regression
Between
regression
Within
regression
Portfolio share 0.0886 0.2510 0.0023
(0.0165) (0.0673) (0.0210)
Time trend 0.0026 0.0022
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Current account (%GDP) -0.4804 -1.3110 -0.1963
(0.0565) (0.2741) (0.0571)
Population 2.30E-10 1.93E-10 1.45E-09
(3.57E-11) (8.47E-11) (3.43E-10)
Population growth 0.0186 -0.0129 0.0229
(0.0041) (0.0155) (0.0047)
GDP per capita -6.74E-06 -2.50E-06 -4.86E-06
(5.91E-07) (1.91E-06) (1.37E-06)
GDP per capita growth -0.0028 0.0149 0.0017
(0.0009) (0.0071) (0.0008)
R2 0.3935 0.8613 0.5829
No. of observations 651 22 651
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Sources: IFS (IMF), WDI (WB), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007),
and own elaboration.
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